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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE C. LEWIS and VERONA 
D. LEWIS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
CLARA A. WHITE and KATHRYN 
\VHITE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
CIVIL NO. 
7807 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF CASE 
The statement of the case made by the appellants 
is so brief that the same does not, in our opinion, give 
the Court sufficient information to enable it to properly 
dispose of the questions which appellants seek to have 
reviewed. We shall therefore call the attention of the 
Court to the evidence which we deem material to the 
issues raised by the pleadings. 
As stated in appellants' brief, the· plaintiffs brought 
this action to recover the possession of a motel located at 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
Pleasant Grove in Utah County, Utah. Plaintiffs based 
their claimed right to declare a forfeiture of the contract 
upon a provi8ion therein contained which provided: 
"In the event of a failure to comply with the 
terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure to 
make any payments when the same shall become 
due or within thirty days thereafter, the Seller 
shall, at his option, be released from all obliga-
tions in law and equity to convey said property 
and all payments which have been made thereto-
fore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be for-
feited to the Seller as liquidated damages for the 
non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer 
agrees that the Seller may, at his option, re-enter 
and take possession of the said premises without 
legal process as in its first and former estate, to-
gether will all improvements and additions made 
by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and 
improvements shall remain with the land and be-
come the property of the Seller, the Buyer becom-
ing at once a tenant at will of the Seller. It is 
agreed that time is the essence of this agreement." 
Plaintiffs demanded judgment that they be restored 
to the possession of the premises; that they be awarded 
damages for the unlawful detainer of the premises from 
and after the 23rd day of August, 1950; that such dam-
ages be trebled and for costs. (R. 3-4) 
To the Complaint defendants filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim in which they admitted that, they, on May 
1, 1949, entered into a contract for the purchase of the 
motel and the furnishings therein; that at the time the 
contract was entered into the sum of $10,256.21 was paid 
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by the defendants on the purehase price and that since 
the contract was executed an additional $3594.14 had 
been paid: that the defendants, by and with the consent 
of the plaintiffs, had renwdeled the kitchen in the motel 
at a cost of $836.00 of which amount $100.00 was derived 
from the sale of s01ne of the furniture in the motel to 
which sale the plaintiff, Clyde C. Lewis, consented. De-
fendants denied that the reasonable rental of the motel 
was $350.00 per month and alleged that such rental did 
not exceed $150.00 per month. 
~ls a further defense and counterclaim, defendants 
alleged that prior to and at the time the contract for the 
sale and purchase of the motel was entered into, the 
plaintiffs falsely and for the purpose of inducing the de-
fendants to enter into the contract for the purchase of 
the motel represented that the same had been and was 
producing a monthly income of not less than $1000.00 
per month; that the same was well insulated and well pro-
vided with sewage disposal; that in fact the motel was 
not and had not been producing to exceed $225.00 per 
month; that the building was not properly insulated or 
well provided with sewage disposal ; that in reliance on 
such false representations and not otherwise, the defend-
ants entered into the contract for the purchase of the 
motel. Defendants further alleged that by reason of 
the fraud perpetrated upon them they had been dam-
aged in the sum of $30,000.00. Defendants further alleged 
that the provisions of the contract relied upon by the 
plaintiffs as the basis for their claimed right to declare 
a forfeiture and to retain the amount paid on the con-
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tract as liquidated damages was null and void in that 
the san1e constitutes a penalty and not liquidated dam-
ages and as such is against public policy. By their amend-
ed answer and counterclaim, defendants prayed judg-
ment that plaintiffs take nothing by their Complaint and 
that defendants be awarded judgment against the plain-
tiffs for the sum of $30,000.00. 
Upon a Motion of the defendants, the Trial Court 
struck the Counterclaim. Upon application of the de-
fendants for a Writ, this Court ordered the Counter-
claim reinstated. White v. District Court, 282 Pac. (2d) 
7'85. Upon the Counterclaim being reinstated, the plain-
tiffs filed a Reply in which they denied generally the 
new matters set up in defendants' Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim. (R. 17) 
At the commencement of the trial it was stipulated: 
That the plain tiffs are the owners of the property de-
scribed in the Complaint; that on August 1, 1951 the 
amount of payments that had accrued under the con-
tract amounted to $4,672.50, of which amount the de-
fendants had paid $3341.14 which amount does not in-
clude the down payment. That at the time of serving the 
notice upon the defendants to vacate the premises, they 
were in arrears in their payment according to the terms 
of the contract in the sum of $1078.36. (R. 7) That de-
fendants received notice of termination of the contract 
on August 17, 1950. 
The plaintiffs offered and there was received in 
evidence the Contract involved in this controversy. Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit A. Perris D. Jensen, one of counsel for 
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plaintiffs, was sworn and identified certain letters 
marked B, C and D which he claims were written to Mrs. 
\Yhite, but upon objection of the defendants the same 
were not adinitted. The letters do not appear in the 
record brought here on appeal. (Tr. 10 to 13) 
Plaintiff, Clyde C. Lewis, was called as a witness 
on his own behalf and testified that he resides at 269·6 
Yerona Circle, Holladay; that he has been in the real 
estate business for 35 or 40 years; that he is a contractor 
and builder; (Tr. 1-1) that the approxirnate rental value 
of the nwtel nrentioned in the contract here involved on 
August 17, 1950 was $350.00 per month, which was the 
amount that he leased the same to Miss Carruth; that 
in the summer he got $3.00 per room a day; that at 
times he got $3.50 per day; that there are 19 rooms be-
sides the kitchen and dining room; that each room had 
a toilet, shower and basin, it also had gas and is located 
on the main highway at Pleasant Grove; that more 
money was n1ade in the summer than in the winter; that 
the property should bring in more than $350.00 per 
month, probably about $400.00-$500.00 a rnonth as an 
average in both surnmer and winter. (Tr. 16) 
An attempt was made to show the amount of pre-
mium that was paid on the fire insurance policy on the 
property, but objections to such testimony was sustained. 
(Tr. 17-20) 
On cross examination, Mr. Lewis testified that in his 
opinion the reasonable market value of the property here 
involved was the price it was sold for; (Tr. 21) that the 
property should rent for $400.00 or $'500.00 per rnonth on 
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August 17, but he did not tell Mrs. White about what it 
would rent for; that Mrs. White did not inquire from 
him as to what this property was bringing at the time 
of the deal; that the property was leased to Miss Car-
ruth at $350.00 per month; (Tr. 22) that Miss Carruth 
cmnplained that the rent was too high and he reduced the 
rent to $300.00 per month; that he did not try to lease 
the property to Miss Carruth when her lease expired 
for $300.00 per month but she tried to lease it from him; 
(Tr. 23) that when he talked to Miss Carruth about 
leasing the property after her lease was up, she said 
$300.00 was too much; that in his opinion the property 
would bring more than $300.00 or $350.00 per month; 
and would bring $400.00 or $500.00 a month. (Tr. 24) 
That he didn't tell Mrs. White· anything about the rent 
that the motel was bringing nor did she ask; (Tr. 25) 
that during the summer season the rooms should rent 
for $3.50 per night; (Tr. 27) that he did not think all 
of the rooms could be rented every night; that a Mr. 
Lyons was in charge of the motel for about a month 
after Miss Carruth quit and he left the rental up to Mr. 
Lyons;· that he didn't tell Mrs. White that Mr. Lyons 
would give her information about the property; that he 
had only seen Mrs. White once; (Tr. 27) that he didn't 
tell Miss Carruth anything about the property; that he 
dealt directly with Miss Carruth in renting the property 
and collecting the rent; (Tr. 28) that Miss Carruth did 
not tell him what she was getting, but merely told him 
that the rent was too high; that he wants to keep the 
home that Mrs. White conveyed to him for which she re-
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ceived a credit of $l0,:2:lO and gPt back the nwtel; ( rrr. 
:29) that he never talked to "Jlr~. \Yhite about the sewer 
or renwdeling the kitchen until after the contract was 
executed and she wanted to have hiln do s01nething about 
enlarging the kitchen and he refused to do anything. (Tr. 
30) That he never at any ti1ue had any conversation 
with "Jirs. 'Yhite about the inc01ue of the property; (Tr. 
31) that a ::\Irs. Hale was in charge of the property be-
fore ::\[iss Carruth, but he did not know where she is. (Tr. 
·~·)) 
.)_ 
Thomas ,Y. Davies was called as a witness by plain-
tiffs and testified that he was and for ten or twelve years 
had been in the real estate business principally in Salt 
Lake County, but had some experience with property in 
rtah County: that he is familiar with the property in-
volved in this controversy; that the market value of that 
propert}~ on ~\ugust 20, 1950 was around $40,000.00, be-
tween $35,000.00 and $40,000.00; that there are 19 units 
in the motel and during the tourist season half of the 
units should average $2.50 to $3.00 a night; that during 
the winter season each unit should rent for $35.00 per 
month which would be 19 times 35 (Tr. 37); that would 
be $1565.00 income per month which the building should 
bring in. (Tr. 38) That the reasonable rental value of 
the property is around $300.00 per month; that a care-
taker could be secured for $125.00 per month along with 
lodging. ( Tr. 39) 
On cross-examination, he testified that the amount 
that property has been producing has a bearing on what 
the property wi.ll lease or sell for; (Tr. 41) that if the 
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19 units wa::; only producing $300.00 per month, it could 
not be well1nanaged; (Tr. 43) that the building consti-
tuting the motel was moved from the steel plant because 
there was no longer any use for it there. (Tr. 44-45) 
The defendant, Mrs. Clara A. White, was called as a 
witness in her own behalf and testified that she resides 
at the motel at Pleasant Grove; (Tr. 46) that she signed 
the contract here involved at her home in Farmington; 
that the plaintiff came up there with Mr. Chidester and 
then he came up there with a lady; that he came to her 
home twice before she signed the contract; that when the 
plaintiff was up there with Mr. Chidester the plaintiff 
''told me that he would like to see me have the motel, 
that I could make more money there, I could make a 
thousand dollars a month clear. He told me it was pro-
ducing a thousand dollars a month at that time. He 
wasn't making so much out of it because all the time he 
had rented it or leased it and he only got $350.00 per 
nwnth for the monthly payments on the lease." "He said 
there wasn't a fruit room, but he would make one in the 
basement-He said he would enlarge the kitchen-" that 
thereafter she went down to see the motel; (Tr. 48) that 
she also had a conversation with the plaintiff when he 
was there with his wife before the contract was executed; 
that on both occasions she had a conversation with the 
defendant as to what the motel was producing; that her 
daughter was present at the time of the conversation had 
with Mr. Lewis and his wife; (Tr. 49) that when he came 
up with his wife, Mr. Lewis stated when Miss Carruth 
was there she had made a thousand dollftrs a month, but 
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he didn't get 1nuch out of it because he only rented it to 
her and he got $3'50.00 per nwnth, and she had never 
failed to pay it, but he knew she was 1naking a great deal 
more than that; that the conversation had with Mr. 
Lewis when his wife was there was before she signed the 
contract; that ~Ir. Lewis told her that when she went to 
see the motel ~Ir. Lyon would be there and would give her 
any additional infor1nation that she Inight desire; that 
she saw :1\Ir. Lyon when she went to see the motel and 
~Ir. Lyon stated to her that there were seven men staying 
there who were paying $2.50 per day. (Tr. 50) That when 
she took over the motel she learned that the men were 
paying only $1.00 per day; that she relied on what :Mr. 
Lewis told her about the income from the motel and 
would not have bought the place if she had known it 
wasn't producing that amount; that she told Mr. Lewis 
that she had no income except what she had made out of 
her place; (Tr. 51) that after she signed the contract, 
Mr. Lewis told her that she could sell the furniture that. 
was not in use and take the money and apply it on en-
larging the kitchen. ·That she sold 20 chrome chairs and 
30 of her own for $100.00 which she used to help pay the 
cost of enlarging the kitchen which cost approximately 
$900.00. A receipt marked Defendant's Exhibit "2" which 
Mrs. White testified was for labor performed in enlarg-
ing the kitchen was received in evidence. There was also 
received in evidence a letter written by the defendant, 
Clyde C. Lewis, which is n1arked Defendants' Exhibit 1. 
~Irs. Lewis further testified that she purchased lumber 
for making the improvements from the Alpine Lumber 
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( ~o1npan~'. (Tr. 51) That she went into possession of the 
motel on ~lay 1, 1949 and in order to get people to come 
to the motel she has had special cards printed for posters, 
put advertising at the library, at the Geneva Plant and in 
the paper. rl,hat in 1949 she took in $137.00 from tour-
ists and in 1950, $127.00; that she had taken in less during 
the year 1951; that she had some other income; during 
four months she had only two boarders at $17.00 a week; 
( Tr. G-1-) that she had an average of four boarders who 
paid $17.00 a week for board and room; that she can get 
$10.00 a week for a room if she furnishes maid service 
and towels; (Tr. 55-56) that it costs her around $5.00 a 
week for laundry for towels, sheets and slips for four 
1nen when she sends it out; that during the second World 
\Var she had 35 boarders in Salt Lake and 12 boarders 
at her house out in Farmington; that she ran a boarding 
house for eight years and made sufficient to take care of 
her family; that she asked ~Ir. Lyon for his books, but 
he said that there were no books kept, only his receipt 
book and she did not see it; that her daughter who signed 
the contract has been residing with her at the motel; that 
before the contract was entered into, Mr. Lewis said that 
the sewer was adequate; that she was compelled to have 
the sewer cleaned out within three weeks from the time 
she moved in which costs $40.00 each time. It must be 
cleaned out twice a year and there is no sewer system, 
but just cesspool and a septic tank. (Tr. 57) That Mr. 
Lewis stated that the motel was thoroughly insulated, 
but there is very little insulation and only black paper 
between the inside and outside walls; that when she· went 
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to ~ee the Inotel ~fr. Lyon ~howed her four romns and 
the others were all occupied and he did not wi~h to dis-
turb the occupants. ( Tr. 58) 
On cross-exrunination, ~lr~. \Yhite testified that the 
seeond tin1e that she had a conversation with n1r. Lewis, 
he told her that she could n1ake $1000.00 a month down 
there; that ~Iiss Carruth had made that; that she had a 
doubt in her 1nind when he first told her, but after repeat-
edly telling her, she believed him. ( Tr. 59-60) That the 
first time she had the conversation with Mr. Lewis was 
in April; that ~Ir. Lewis brought his wife about two 
weeks after the first visit; (Tr. 63) that both conversa-
tions took place before Easter Sunday; that she didn't 
see :\Ir. Lewis at F·armington after she signed the pre-
liminary contract. (Tr. 64) ~J rs. White was cross-
examined at some length about what Mr. Lewis told her, 
but in the main her testimony was a repetition of what 
she testified to on her direct examination. 
On being cross-examined as to why she did not ask 
:Miss Carruth what she made while running the motel, 
:\Irs. White testified that she did not think anyone knew 
where she was; that she asked a number of people where 
she was, but she was not in Utah. (Tr. 80) That she didn't 
know of her own knowledge that it didn't bring in a 
$1000.00 per month; that Mr. Lewis did not say whether 
the $1000.00 a month was net or gross; that when she 
first went into the motel the highway in front of the 
motel was not torn up; but it was torn up later and the 
road was finished in October; that when the street was 
torn up, they had to go around to the back; that while the 
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street was torn up, it probably temporarily affected the 
income from the motel. (Tr. 82-83) Mrs. White further 
testified that at one time after she got the notice of evic-
tion she talked to Mr. Jensen about being given a chance 
to pay up her back payments and Mr. Jensen said he 
would see Mr. Lewis, but he doubted if Mr. Lewis would 
give her any additional time. (Tr. 107) That Mr. Jensen 
did not agree to accept $100.00 a week until the arrears 
were paid up. (Tr. 109) That she borrowed money on 
her furniture, rings and car to pay up what she owed 
as of June 23rd; (Tr. 109) that Mr. Jensen did not give 
her any time to make up the defaulted payments. (Tr. 
111) 
On re-direct examination, Mrs. White testified that 
she was in error as to the cost of fixing the fruit room 
instead of $200.00, it was $80.00. (R. 114) Mrs. White 
further testified that she tried to arrange with Mr. J en-
sen to pay $100.00 a week until she got caught up with 
her payments, but Mr. Jensen did not so agree and she 
took the letter over to Mr. Dalton and she raised approxi-
mately $1600.00 on her furniture, rings, jewelry and car 
which she paid in a lump sum after she had the conver-
sation with Mr. Jensen. (Tr. 116) Exhibit 3 is a receipt 
for $1694.14 for the mol).ey paid on June 12, 1950. 
Leon E. Smith, a witness called by defendants testi-
fied that he stayed at the motel while Miss Carruth oper-
ated it and for a few days after Mrs. White took it over; 
that he was there when Mr. Lyon had charge; that he was 
paying $1.00 per day for his room. (Tr. 90); that while 
Miss Carruth was operating the motel, the sewer backed 
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up and ran into the romn; (Tr. 91) that while he was 
there it was a rare occasion that cars were parked there 
except those who stayed there; that there would be two to 
five, usually just two cars parked at the motel each night. 
(Tr. 92) 
:\laud Carruth was called as a witness by the defend-
ants and testified that she had a lease on the motel at 
Pleasant Grove ~larch 4, 1948 to April1, 1949 at $3'50.00 
per Inonth ~ (Tr. 119-120) that while she operated the 
motel she kept informed as to every public occurrence 
that took place in Utah County; that when the B.Y. had 
an intercollegiate meet she got in touch with the coach, 
that she advertised in Southern Utah at conference time; 
that she had cards printed which she distributed to her 
guests and 1nailed out all over the county; (Tr. 121) 
that during the year she operated the motel her total re-
ceipts were $4201.7·5; that she did not continue to pay 
$330.00 ($350.00) a month during the time she operated 
the motel; that she couldn't take in enough money to pay 
Mr. Lewis from the income from the motel, but had to 
draw on her bank account; ('Tr. 122) that she finally 
prevailed upon Mr. Lewis to reduce the rent to $300.00 
per month; that she paid $350.00 for 4 or 5 months and 
$300.00 for the remainder; (Tr. 123) Miss Carruth fur-
ther testified that she had a number of conversations 
with Mr. Lewis in which she told him that she didn't 
make $300.00 a month; that the motel w·as in the wrong 
location to which Mr. Lewis said "I think you are right"; 
(Tr. 125) that she repeatedly told Mr. Lewis that she 
couldn't meet the payments of rent; (Tr. 127) that after 
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paying for the utilities there was not enough left to pay 
$300.00. (Tr. 128) She further testified that she first 
met 1\lrs. White one week ago Saturday; (Tr. 129) that 
she has had experience in operating a tea room at Coal-
ville, Utah; a resident hotel in Washington, D.C. On 
cross-examination she testified that the only experience 
she has had in operating a motel was the one belonging 
to ~fr. Lewis. (Tr. 112) 
Lawrence Atwood was called as a witness by the de-
fendants and testified that he is engaged in the real es-
tate business; (Tr. 135) that he served as a County 
Assessor of Utah County for about 14 years. Counsel 
for the plaintiff asked and was granted leave to examine 
the witness on voir dire. Such examination was quite 
extensive and will be found in Transcript 136-146. Mr. 
Atwood testified that he had examined the Lewis Motel 
and being asked a hypothetical question he stated that in 
his opinion the Lewis Motel on ~fay 1, 1949 had a market 
value of $14,165 if it was producing $350.00 per month, 
and if it was or had been producing $1000.00 per month, 
its market value would be about $42,500.00. (Tr. 147-148) 
~r r. Atwood was cross-examined at some length but did 
not change his opinion. (Tr.148-165) 
Thomas H. Heal was called as a witness by the de-
fendants and in part testified as follows: That he is and 
since 1914 has been engaged in the real estate business, 
that he has handled all kinds of real estate deals, farms, 
homes, ranches, apartments, motels, most everything in 
real estate. In answer to a hypothetical question he ex-
pressed the opinion that if the value of the property as 
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of :Jiay 1. 1949 wa~ fixed at $42,500 a fair value if it was 
bringing in $350.00 n nwnth would be $14,166.00. His 
cross-exan1ination (Tr. 17~-E)~ and 194 to 197) did not 
change his opinion. 
Ralph Chmnberlain was called as a witness by de-
fendants and testified that he was fan1iliar with the motel 
that :J[rs. \Yhite had been operating; that he stayed at 
that place while 1Iiss Carruth operated it; (Tr. 198) 
and while ~Ir. Lyon was there; that upon 3 or -! occasions 
the sewer would boil back into the shower and make it 
quite unpleasant~ (Tr. 199) that when he was there some 
spots were not covered with insulation and several of the 
braces were broken; that while he was there he did not 
see more than six transients stop there in a month; (Tr. 
200) that he helped unplug sewer pipes while Miss Car-
ruth was there. (Tr. 201) 
Harold vVootten was called as a witness and testified 
that he resides at Pleasant Grove and has had experience 
as a builder. (Tr. 209) That he did work for Mrs. White 
in repairing plumbing and enlarging the kitchen at the 
motel operated by Mrs. White; (Tr. 210) that he took 
out a partition, put in a doorway and lined it on both 
sides, put in extra lights, took out the meter box and re-
inforced the top of the kitchen; (Tr. 212) that he also 
changed the electric system; (Tr. 213) that of the money 
paid him by l\Irs. White, about $700.00 or $750.00 was 
for enlarging the kitchen; (Tr. 214) that he did other 
work in repairing the building and moving the insula-
tion; (Tr. 215-216) that the cesspool was improperly 
constructed. ('Tr. 217) On cross-examination, he· testi-
fied that he was not a licensed electrician or plumber 
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when he did the work for l\1 rs. White, but had had con-
siderable experience in that kind of work. (Tr. 221) 
Ralph Hahn was called as a witness for the defend-
ant::; and testified that he resided at Provo and was a 
real estate salesman by occupation; (Tr. 238) that he is 
acquainted with the motel occupied by :Mrs. White: (Tr. 
~~H) that if the property had a gross income on ~Iay 1, 
1949 of $350.00 per month, its market value in his opin-
ion would be $15,000.00, if it had an income of $1000.00 
per month, it would be worth about three times that; (Tr. 
~-+ 1) that because of its construction it would in his opin-
ion be worth 38 to 40 thousand. (Tr. 242) :Jfr. 
Hahn was cross-examined at great length. (Tr. 243-264) 
Among other matters he was asked what effect if any 
would be the effect on the income of the motel if Rita 
Hayworth or Jim Farley were operating the apartment. 
(Tr. 253) He was further re-cross examined (Tr. 267 to 
:275) but his testimony as to value was not changed. 
Darleene Rogas, a witness called by defendants testi-
fied that she on Easter Sunday, April 17, 1949 in com-
pany with l\irs. White went to the motel which ~Irs. 
""\Vhite later operated; that she met Mr. Lyon who was 
in charge of the motel on the day she went with Mrs. 
White; that My Lyon stated to Mrs. White that he had 
seven rooms rented at $2.50 to steady roomers and the 
other rooms rented to transients at $4.50 and $5.00 a 
room. (Tr. 276-277) Mrs. White was recalled and testi-
fied that Mr. Lyon made out and gave her a list of the 
furniture; (Tr. 280-281) that when she checked the list 
with the furniture in the motel, there was missing three 
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night stand~, three or four occasional chairs, there were 
no XaYajo rugs: but that there were three rugs (Tr. 281) 
there were only 1~ large beds; that all of the furniture 
except that which was sold and the three rugs and linen 
that has worn out is all still there. (Tr. 282) 
Edwin Butterworth was called as a witness by the 
plaintiffs (out of order) and testified that he is and 
for 44 years he has been in the real estate business at 
Salt Lake City, Utah; that he heard a conversation at his 
office in Salt Lake between Mr. Chidester and Mrs. 
White about a week or a week and a half before Mrs. 
White entered into the contract to purchase the motel; 
that he thought :Mrs. White expressed some doubt if she 
could make a go of the motel, and that Mr. Chidester 
said "If you take in some boarders in connection with 
that thing, I believe it will be possible to make the thing 
go." (Tr. 289-290) Mr. Butterworth testified that the 
market value of the motel on April26, 1949 was $42,000.-
00. (Tr. 294) On cross-examination, Mr. Butterworth 
testified that motels and other buildings used as commer-
cial property, income is a very important matter; that in 
taking listings of property he always puts the income 
thereof in the listing. A determining factor with a pur-
chaser is income. (Tr. 296) Mr. Butterworth was asked 
the following questions and he gave the following an-
swers: 
"Q. Assuming that this property was actually 
bringing in a gross income of $350.00 a month 
a year prior to the execution of this contract, 
and it was represented to have been produc~ 
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ing a thousand dollars a month during that 
period of time, would that be a very import-
ant matter to take into consideration in the 
purchase~ 
"A. Absolutely. 
Q. Would you give us a judgment as to the dif-
fe-rence in value, other things being equal be-
tween a piece of property, a motel that 'was 
bringing in $350.00 per month and a motel 
that was bringing in a thousand dollars a 
month, the relative difference in value~ 
"A. I would say it would be in the direct propor-
tion to the income--three times as much as 
you indicate." (Tr. 297) 
Kathryn White, one of the defendants, was called 
and testified on behalf of the defendants. She testified 
that she participated in the negotiations leading up to 
the execution of the contract for the sale and purchase 
of the motel at 'Pleasant Grove. (Tr. 299) That Mr. 
Lewis came up with Mr. Chidester to see her mother's 
home at F'armington; that Mr. Lewis said that he had 
a motel at Pleasant Grove for sale that was bringing 
in a thousand dollars a month and that it was leased for 
$350.00 per month; that the lessee had given up the lease 
and a Mr. Lyons was in charge of the property; that Mr. 
Lewis looked over the house and grounds of her mother's 
property at F'armington; (Tr. 300) that about a week 
after his first visit to Farmington, Mr. Lewis came up 
there with a woman he introduced as his wife; that at the 
second trip Mr. Lewis stated that the motel at Pleasant 
Grove had been bringing $1000.00 per month and Miss 
Carruth had been paying a rental of $350.00 per month; 
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that :Jir. Lewis said he would enlarge the kitchen; that at 
the tin1e of the second Yisi t of nlr. Lewis she and her 
mother had been down and seen the 1notel at Pleasant 
Grove. (Tr. ~~0:2) That }[r. Lyon showed then1 through 
the n1otel; that he stated that the ones who were perman-
ent renters paid $2.50 a night and he was getting $4.50 
for one party and $5.00 for two; (Tr. 302) that she 
signed the contract with her mother but she had given 
her mother a Quit Claim Deed to the property; that when 
~Ir. Lewis first stated that the motel was and had been 
bringing in $1000.00 per month, she did not believe him, 
but he kept repeating it until she did believe him and 
she would not have signed if l\Ir. Lewis had not told them 
that it had been producing $1000.00per month; (Tr. 303) 
that she and her mother have been operating the motel 
since the contract was signed; that the furniture is still 
in the motel except that which was sold and that which 
has worn out; that the day after they moved in they be-
gan having trouble with the sewer backing up; (Tr. 
305); that when she and her mother took possession of 
the motel there were seven roomers who were paying 
$1.00 per day; that since they have been operating the 
motel she believes the average number of roomers has 
been less than four; that one year they made $137.00 
on transient trade and the next year $127.00; that they 
have charged $3.00 for one transient person and $3.50 
for two. (Tr. 306) On cross-examination, Kathryn White 
was asked if Mr. Lewis told her where Miss Carruth re-
sided and she said he did not and that she did not know 
where :Miss Carruth lived. (Tr. 309) 
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Joseph Lyon was called as a witness by plaintiffs 
and testified that he was and for about 20 years has been 
in the hotel business; (Tr. 316) that on Easter Sunday 
1949 he showed Mrs. and Miss White some of the rooms 
in the motel at Pleasant Grove; that at that time there 
were nine rooms occupied; the persons occupying the 
romns were permanent guests paying $7.00 a week; (Tr. 
318) that he didn't recall whether Mrs. White asked to 
see the books that were being kept; that he didn't offer 
to show her the books; that he told Mrs. White that she 
could not step right in and make as much as she thought 
in the rnotel business; that it would take a little time to 
build up the business, but a rooming or boarding house 
would be all right. (Tr. 319) That he told her she should 
be able to make $600.00 a month on her rooms and $400.00 
a month on food or a thousand dollars a month; that he 
didn't tell Mrs. White what had been made out of the 
motel because he did not know that; that he was in charge 
of the motel during the month of April and a day or two 
in March; that he left on the first of May; that he did not 
show Mrs. White the books when she was there on Easter 
Sunday; (Tr. 320) that Mrs. White may have asked for 
the books but he had no authority to show the books to 
anyone; that on the day Mrs. White took over he bought 
a ledger and wrote in it the seven roomers who were 
there; ( Tr. 321) that during the month that Mr. Lyon 
was operating the motel the income was around $250.00, 
"I think $255.00." (Tr. 333) 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit G, was offered and received in 
evidence. (Tr. 333) That exhibit shows that the total 
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income of the property for one day in ~larch and :27 
days in April to be $255.00. 
The plaintiff wa~ recalled and in rebuttal testified: 
That the first tirne he went to Farmington to see Mrs. 
\Yhite, :Jlr. Chidester went with hin1; that he had a con-
versation with :Jirs. \Yhite in which he told Mrs. White 
that it was leased at $3'50.00 and he cut it down to $300.-
00; that when asked about the income frmn the rnotel, he 
told the defendants that he had no way of knowing; that 
he told her it had never brought in what it should have, 
but that "-as practically all that was said about it; that 
in the conversation he told Mrs. White that the property 
should be run as a boarding house; (Tr. 338-339) that 
~Ir. Lewis rnade a second visit to Farmington with his 
wife; that on the second visit he talked about when Mrs. 
White was 1noving; ~hat he never told Mrs. White and 
her daughter that the rnotel had earned $1000.00 during 
the time ~fiss Carruth had it. (Tr. 342) He did not think 
anything was said about the cesspool or sewage in his 
talk with ~Irs. White. (Tr. 344) 
On cross-examination, ~fr. Lewis testified that he 
thought Mrs. White made inquiry about the income of the 
motel the first time he was up to Farmington; that he 
told her it was leased for $350.00 and had been reduced 
to $300.00; that he told Mrs. White that he had volun-
tarily reduced the rent to $300.00 because she (Miss 
Carruth) thought it was too much; (Tr. 349) that he told 
her (Mrs. White) that Miss Carruth asked to have the 
rent reduced because she wasn't making any money; 
that ~Irs. \Yhite said that she was going to run a board-
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ing house; that he didn't know what the motel brought 
in; (Tr. 350) that Miss Carruth told him that the motel 
was not bringing in ~no ugh to pay him $300.00 a month; 
that l\1 iss Carruth told him that she would not take the 
nwtel and pay $300.00 a month rent; that he didn't tell 
l\1 rs. White that Miss Carruth had told him that she 
couldn't pay $300.00 a month for the motel; that he didn't 
think that was brought up; (Tr. 352-353) that he told 
Mrs. White that he had reduced the rent from $350.00 to 
$300.00 because Miss Carruth claimed the rent was too 
high; that the second time he was up to Farmington the 
1natter of the income of the motel was not mentioned; 
(Tr. 355) that when he entered into this contract with 
Mrs. White he knew that she had no means of paying for 
the property except from the income she would receive 
from the motel. (Tr. 357) 
The plaintiff, Verona D. Lewis, was called as a wit-
ness and testified on behalf of the plaintiffs that she went 
to Farmington with :\Ir. Lewis a short time before Mrs. 
White moved; that she met and talked with Mrs. \Vbite 
and her daughter, Kathryn; (Tr. 359) that Mrs. White 
showed them through the house; that the Pleasant Grove 
property was not mentioned in her presence. (Tr. 360) 
Ben H. Davis was called as a witness by the plain-
tiffs and testified that he is a building contractor; (Tr. 
364) that he has examined the motel building here in-
volved; that the building is of standard construction ex-
cept the dining room; ( Tr. 365) that the cost of con-
structing such a building on May 1, 1939 would be about 
$9.00 a square foot. (Tr. 366) On cross-examination he 
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the building; that he ass tuned the roof was of standard 
construction, but did not know frmn his own observa-
tion. (Tr. 368) 
Defendant, Clyde C. Lewis, was again reealled 
and further testified: He "·ns asked if he had extended 
:Jirs. Lewis additional tin1e to pay the tin1e payments. 
rpon objection being made that such testimony was im-
material and that if a waiver of the fraud was claimed 
such waiver \Yas not pleaded, the objection was sustain-
ed. (Tr. 370-372) 
Perris Jensen, one of the counsel for the plaintiffs, 
was sworn and testified on behalf of the plaintiffs. After 
being examined as to his experience in appraising prop-
erty (Tr. 374-376 he testified that the value of the prop-
erty based on income would not be in proportion to in-
come because the cost of operation remains more or less 
constant. (Tr. 378) He testified that in his opinion the 
rental or income value of the motel is for 180 days of the 
year $9,700.00 and the other six months $5,200.00 or a 
total for the year of $14,900.00 (Tr. 380) and after de-
ducting 25 or 30% for vacancies, the net gross rental is 
$10,350 and the reasonable expense of operating should 
be $6500.00 per year, that item includes $1200.00 forma~­
aging and $1200.00 for maid service per year; that the 
net income would be $3850.00; (Tr. 381) that there would 
be no difference in the value of the property if it had 
an income of $1000.00 per month and if it had an income 
of $350.00 per month; (Tr. 382) that he has examined 
the motel and it is properly constructed. (Tr. 383) 
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On cross-examination, he testified that he was aware 
that except in a case of real urgency and necessity our 
Rupreme ( ~ourt has said it is improper for an attorney 
to te~t if\' in his own case, but that he considered it urgent 
that he tP~tif\ in this case; (Tr. 385) that the income 
of property within limits is an important fact in deter-
lllining values; that the income of property may or may 
not effect value; (Tr. 386); that considering income alone 
and at $350.00 rental income, a building on that land 
would have a value of about $1,000.00 that it would cost 
about as much to manage a property bringing in $350.00 
per month as it would for property bringing in $1000.00 
per month, but only about one-half as much for maid 
service; (Tr. 388) that if the property was bringing in 
$350.00 per month gross income, the expense of opera-
tion would be $3950.00 a year or about $330.00 a month; 
that if a motel brings in only $350.00 per month it would 
be worth only about $1000.00 as a motel, but it might be 
used for other purposes; that this property would make 
a very splendid maternity hospital or convalescent home 
or old folks home, or it could be adopted for use by the 
students of the B.Y.U.; that he does not know that there 
is a greater need for maternity homes than there is for 
motels in that neighborhood; that he has not inquired 
to find out how many women there are over in Pleasant 
Grove who are looking for a maternity home; that the 
rooms at the motel are about 11 foot rooms and that 
three or four students could be put in one room; that the 
rooms may be a little less than 13 feet in one dimension; 
that Mrs. White would do well to get four children, boys 
or girls into one room and get $15.00 each or $60.00; that 
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she could get a bus to take the students to and from 
school which would not eo~t 1nuch (Tr. 391) that if the 
motel could not be n1ade to pay where it is, it 1night be 
moved. (Tr. 392) 
Cotmsel for plaintiff offered to show by .Mr. Lewis 
that "The testi1nony was that the defendant, after she 
had discovered the fraud and was in default on her pay-
ments, that she approached the plaintiff, Mr. Lewis, and 
requested an extension of time to make her delinquent 
payments and that Mr. Lewis agreed to give her an e-xtra 
tin1e, which she did not thereafter accept and perform." 
Upon objection the court stated that he had already ruled 
on the offer. (Tr. 396) 
Arthur Welles Anderson was called as a witness· 
by the plaintiffs and testified that he put the plumbing 
in the motel; that the material used was standard ma-
terial; that the work of putting it in was done according 
to the State Code of Utah; ( Tr. 398-399) that he put 
in the heating plant at a cost of about $1800.00. (Tr. 
400) 
Mrs. Verona D. Lewis was recalled by defendants 
and asked if while at the horne of Mrs. White in F·arrn-
ington she said in words or in substance that Miss Car-
ruth had been making oodles of money at the motel at 
Pleasant Grove but her husband didn't get much of the 
money because it was rented for $350.00 a month. She 
answered "Indeed I did not, no sir." (Tr. 402) The de-
fendants, Whites, testified that Mrs. Lewis did make such 
statement. (Tr. 403 and 405); Mrs. White further testi-
fied that she had never been in Mr. Butterworth's office 
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with l\1 r. Chidester and did not there talk with l\Ir. 
Chidester concerning the income of the· motel; (Tr. 403) 
~he further testified that she did not know anything 
about the first agreement for the purchase of the motel 
until after Mr. Lewis had been up to her home in Farm-
ington. (Tr. 404) 
After the Court gave its instructions to the jury, 
counsel for the plaintiffs stated: "The plaintiffs except 
to the Court's ruling denying the plaintiffs the right to 
~how that the defendants, after having knowledge of the 
fraud, requested an extension of time for payment of de-
linquent payments for the purpose of showing that the 
defendants waived the fraud, if any." 
The plaintiffs except the Court's ruling wherein the 
court refused to instruct the jury that it must find that 
the defendants must have reasonably relied upon the mis-
representations of the plaintiffs, if any. (Tr. 408) 
The defendants took no exceptions to the Court's 
instructions to the jury. 
It will be noted that plaintiffs included in their re-
quests for instructions to the jury the following: "You 
are instructed that even if the plaintiff, Clyde Lewis, 
made the statement that the income from the motel was 
$1000.00 a month, prior to the signing of the contract, 
if you find from the evidence that the defendants had 
reasonable opportunity to determine th~ truth or falsity 
of said statement, they had no right to rely upon the 
statement and are not entitled to damages for such false 
statement." (R. 19) It will be noted that the instruc-
tion just mentioned is not marked as having been acted 
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upon which is doubtless due to the fact that the request 
was apparently not presented until after the verdict of 
the jury was rendered. The verdict was rendered on 
Septe1nber 27, 1951 (R. 35) while the request above 
quoted appears fron1 the strunp of the clerk to have been 
filed on September :2S, 1951. ( R. 19) 
By its verdict, the jury found: 
1. That the reasonable rental value of the premises 
between ~lugust 23, 1950 and the present day to be $100.-
00 per month. 
2. That the plaintiffs misrepresented the income 
that was being produced by the property. 
3. That the plaintiffs misrepresented the condition 
of the sewage system. 
-t That the reasonable market value of the prop-
erty on ~lay 1, 1949, was $14,000.00. 
5. That if the property had been as represented and 
was producing the income as represented by them, it 
would have had a reasonable market value of $42,000.00. 
6. That the plaintiffs agreed that defendants might 
remodel and improve the property and receive credit 
or payment therefor. 
7. That the reasonable cost of the improvements 
made was $800.00. (R. 34-35) 
After the verdict was returned by the jury, the par-
ties appeared in Court for the purpose of discussing the 
judgment that should be rendered. Counsel for the de-
fendants stated that the defendants were willing, if 
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the Court could find that it might lawfully be done, to 
have judgment rendered against them for the amount 
clai1ned they were entitled to, including possession of 
the property if defendants were awarded a judgment 
for the difference as found by the jury between the actual 
market value of the property and the market value it 
would have if it had been as represented. Counsel for 
plaintiffs stated that "we have nothing to say at this 
time." (R. 410) 
The Trial Court made Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and rendered its Judgment by which plaintiffs 
were awarded possession of the real and personal prop-
erty described in the contract for the sale and purchase 
of the motel and the defendants were awarded a judg-
ment against the plaintiffs for the sum of $23,642.64. (R. 
41) 
Plaintiffs appeal only from the money judgment 
against them. 
In the foregoing statement of the case, we may have 
recited the evidence in greater detail than is usual, but in 
our opinion the questions raised by the appellants on 
this appeal are in the main disposed of by the facts testi-
fied to by the parties and found by the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
In our argument we have concluded first to discuss 
the points raised by the appellants and then take up 
some other ,points in the nature of cross assignments of 
errors in support of the judgment appealed from. 
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~-\X8\YER TO ~-\PPELLANTS' POINT ONE 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFFS MADE 
THE FALSE REPRESENTATIONS ALLEGED. 
Fnder their Point One, it is stated that respondents 
failed to establish the false representations alleged. It 
is not clear whether they claim that defendants failed to 
establish the false representations touching the matter 
of the incmne that was being produced by the property 
or only "·ith resp~t to the insulation and the sewage. 
It is true, as plaintiffs allege, that defendants abandoned 
all claim for da1nages on account of the insulation and 
such question \Yas not submitted to the jury. There was 
evidence offered which showed that the motel was poorly 
insulated, but in light of the fact that the defendants ex-
amined the property before they signed the contract and 
further that no evidence was offered which tended to 
show the amount of damages occasioned by the defective 
insulation, the defendants voluntarily abandoned any 
claim for damages on that account. The claim for dam-
ages haVing been abandoned, that should end all contro-
versy about insulation. However, there is evidence that 
the motel was poorly insulated .. Mrs. White testified that 
Mr. Lewis told her that the motel was thoroughly in-
sulated. That in fact there was very little insulation, 
there is nothing between the insidewall and the outside 
wall except black paper; that the ceiling has just very 
little rock wool in it, and it is just in places where it is 
all black the dust and dirt from the ceiling has come 
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through so it shows in the dining room there is no insula-
tion tll(~re. (Tr. 58) 
On cross-examination she testified that she didn't 
go up into the attic; that there are little cracks all up 
and down the board where they are put together and 
that she could put her finger through that "you could 
take a lantern and look and all you can see is black 
paper; that is no insulation there that I can see but I 
' 
can't go up in the attic because I can't climb." (Tr. 94) 
That she first noticed that condition "the first winter 
when we were there when the wind blew through." (Tr. 
95) There is other evidence of similar import (See 
testimony of Ralph Chamberlain) (Tr. 200) but in light of 
the fact that defendants make no claim growing out of the 
condition of the insulation, no useful purpose will be 
served by going further into that phase of the case. 
There is substantial evidence to the effect that the 
sewage disposal system is inadequate and of course 
defendant could not be expected to discover such fact 
when she visited the property just before she signed 
the contract for the purchase of the motel. As to the 
sewage system, defendant, Clara A. White, testified 
that when she was negotiating for the purchase of the 
motel Mr. Lewis stated to her that the sewage system 
was adequate; that she had to have the sewage system 
cleaned out within three weeks after she moved down 
there; that she had to have it cleaned out twice· a year; 
that it costs $40.00 to have it cleaned out. (Tr. 57) 
Leon E. Smith testified that when Miss Carruth was 
operating the motel, the sewage backed up into his room. 
(Tr. 91) Ralph Chamberlain testified that he stayed at 
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the motel in question about 3 1nonths: that on three or 
four occasions while he was there the sewage "boiled 
back up into the shovler and just boiled over the cOin-
mode and 1nade it quite unpleasant.'' (Tr. 199) 
Harold \Y ootten testified that he stayed at the 
motel operated by .Jlrs. \Vhite fr01n Oct. 6, 1949 to Jan. 
1951. That about once a week there would be a sewer 
or something that would leak and we would have to 
rean1 the seat out, which is very costly, takes special 
tools. \Ye had to consistently clean out the sewer lines, 
the slope wasn't adequate. (Tr. 214) That he was 
"never to the bottom of the cesspool, but I would say the 
cesspool definitely isn't deep enough; they didn't dig 
it down until they hit a body of gravel. A cesspool has 
to be into a large body of gravel or you can't dispose of 
the water; they didn't have enough vents to take away 
foul odors from the cesspool. I would say the drain is 
not steep enough to take the water fast enough to take 
the solids out; they consistently plugged and water run-
ning over and sewage come up into the room and several 
times it has come up and right out on the floor; that 
the people were consistently complaining about it." (Tr. 
217) 
The defendant Kathryn White testified that since 
they have been operating the motel, they have had con-
siderable trouble with the sewage system; that the day 
after they moved in the sewer backed up; that she got it 
fixed temporarily and within a month they got it cleaned 
out; that it was necessary to have it cleaned out every 
six months (Tr. 305); that when they were negotiating 
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for the purchase of the motel, Mr. Lewis said the sewer 
was adequate. (Tr. 306) Moreover, when the question 
was asked the witnesses touching the market value of 
the motel the matter of the inadequate means of dispos-
ing of the sewage was not included in the inquiry as to 
values. If it be claimed by the plaintiffs under their 
point one that respondents failed to prove a prima facie 
case of false representations, the evidence including that 
of the plaintiff, Clyde C. Lewis, is all to the effect that 
false representations as to the income of the motel were 
made by the defendant Clyde C. Lewis. 
Defendant Clara A. White testified that the first 
time Mr. Lewis came to see her at her home in Farm-
ington, he told her that the motel was producing a 
thousand dollars a month; that he had leased it but he 
only got $350.00 per month; that when the plaintiff came 
up to F·armington the second time he again told her 
that while Miss Carruth had a lease on the property she 
had made a thousand dollars per month and she had 
never failed to pay; that both of these conversations 
were had before the contract for the purchase of the 
motel was signed. (Tr. 48-49) Mrs. White also testified 
that when Mr. Lewis was up at Farmington on the second 
occasion with his wife, the plaintiff Verona D. Lewis 
stated that Miss Carruth had been making oodles of 
money at the motel at Pleasant Grove, but that Mr. 
Lewis didn't get much because he only got $350.00. 
(Tr. 403) 
The other defendant Kathryn White testified that 
upon both of the occasions when Mr. Lewis was up to 
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Farmington before the contract for the purchase of 
the motel was signed, he repeatedly stated that the nwtel 
was bringing in a thousand dollars a n1onth, but he had 
it leased and was only getting $350.00 (Tr. 300-301-303); 
that when ~Ir. Lewis and his wife were up there, his 
wife, plaintiff Yerona D. Lewis, stated that Miss Carruth 
had been n1aking oodles of money out of the motel at 
Pleasant Grove but that ~lr. Lewis was not getting much 
only $350.00 per month. 
In connection with the testimony of the defendants 
as to representations as to the income of the motel 
just before the contract was signed, let us examine the 
testimony of the plaintiff Clyde C. Lewis. When he was 
first called as a witness and before Miss Carruth testi-
fied, .Mr. Lewis was asked these questions and gave these 
answers: 
"Q. Did you tell ~irs. White that the property 
should rent for 4 or 5 hundred dollars a 
month? 
A. I never had an opportunity to tell Mrs. White 
anything. 
Q. Did you tell Mrs. White anything about what 
it would rent for? 
A. No sir. 
Q. So that you mean to say Mrs. White bought 
this property without making any inquiry 
whatsoever as to what it was producing~ 
A. That I don't know. It was up to Mr. Chi-
dester, he made the deal, what he told her I 
don't know. 
Q. You don't know anything about what Mr. 
Chideste·r told her? 
A. I don't know. 
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Q. lam asking what you told her. 
A. I didn't tell her anything about it. 
(l. You rnean by that she didn't make any in-
quiry of you as to what this property was 
bringing in at the time you made the deaU 
A. ~,hat is absolutely right. 
Q. Are you sure of that? 
A. I am sure about it. 
Q. All right, you say it was renting for $350.00 
about one month before this? 
A. It was leased for one year for $350.00. 
Q. To Miss Carruth? 
A. That's right." (Tr. 22) 
l\fr. Lewis was then cross-examined as to his lease 
to ~Iiss Carruth and among other things stated that he 
reduced the rent because Miss Carruth told him the 
rent was too much. (Tr. 23-24) _Mr. Lewis, after having 
stated that the motel should rent for $400.00 or $500.00 
per month, was asked: 
"Q. You didn't tell ~Irs. White that did you? 
A. I didn't tell Mrs. White anything. 
Q. She just went and made the deal without ask-
ing you a thing about what it was renting 
for~ 
A. That's right, as far as I was concerned, she 
didn't ask me a thing. I didn't see her but 
once before the deal was made. 
Q. All right, that once you saw her, was that 
thing discussed. 
A. I 1nerely went up to look at her property, 
she hadn't seen mine. 
Q. But you didn't tell her a thing about what 
it was bringing in ? 
A. Absolutely not." (Tr. 25) 
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Later on during the cross-exa1uination of ~[ r. Lewis 
this occurred: 
"Q. 1 ou 1nean to say you didn't tell 1\lr~. White 
where she eould get the information about 
this property, what it was renting for and 
other infonnation necessary1 
~l. I didn't tell ~Irs. White anything about the 
property. I only saw her once. I w·ent up to 
look at her property and she hadn't seen 
nrine. 1Nhy should I go into what mine would 
produce~ 
Q. I don't know why you should, but did you 1 
~-\.. X o, I didn't. 
Q. In other words, you didn't tell her a thing 
about this property f' 
To which question counsel for the plaintiffs objected 
because the same question has been asked half a dozen 
times. (Tr. 27-28) 
He further testified that he did not participate in 
the deal at all but merely signed the papers. (Tr. 28) 
After ~Iiss Carruth had testified that during the 
year she leased the property she took in a total of 
$4201.75, which was not sufficient to pay the rent and 
that she prevailed on Mr. Lewis after 4 or 5 months 
to reduce the rent to $300.00 per month. (Tr. 119-128) 
~Ir. Lewis was recalled and testified as follows: 
"Q. The first time you went up did Mrs. White 
1nake any inquiry whatsoever about the in-
come of the property you had at Pleasant 
Grove1 
A. Well, I think she made that inquiry, yes. 
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Q. All right, the first time you were there she 
asked what it was bringing in and what did 
you tell her? 
A. I told her that it had been leased for $350.00 
and had been reduced to $300.00. 
Q. You told her that it had been leased for 
$350.00 and been reduced to $300.00, is that 
right~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Did you tell her why it had been reduced from 
$350.00 to $300.00 ~ 
A. I made the statement yes, that she thought 
it was too much and I voluntarily reduced it. 
Q. Did you tell her why she thought it was too 
much, ~Iiss Carruth~ 
A. Naturally because she wasn't making any 
money, she wasn't taking in enough money 
to pay that according to her statement. 
(Tr. 349-350) 
A comparison of the testimony of Mr. Lewis when 
he was first called to testify and when he was recalled 
to testify after :Miss Carruth had testified make it appar-
ent why the jury was more than justified in not believing 
the testimony of Mr. Lewis. Further on in the cross-
examination of Mr. Lewis after much hedging, he testi-
fied that ~fiss Carruth possibly said she couldn't make 
$300.00 a 1nonth out of the motel, but he didn't believe 
he told Mrs. White what Miss Carruth said. (Tr. 352) 
The authorities are all to the effect, so far as we 
are able to ascertain, that the misrepresentation of the 
incmne of property is the misrepresentation of a fact 
and if false is the basis for an action for fraud. The law 
is thus stated in 23 Am. Jur. 841, Sec. 68: 
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··A false representation by an owner of land, 
or his agent, seeking to dispose of the property 
commercially, as to the present or past income, 
profits or produce thereof or as to the arnount of 
rent receiYed therefor is regarded as a state1nent 
of fact upon which fraud nmy be predicated if 
it is false since these are matters within the 
representor's own knowledge. The same is true 
of an assertion that the profits of a business are 
or have been a certain sum annually, or a false 
statement as to what a business now earns." 
Numerous cases including the case of Hecht v. 
Metzler, 14 Utah .J-08; -1-8 Pac. 37; 60 Am. St. Rep. 906 
are cited in footnotes which sustain the doctrine an-
nounced in the text. 
~~XS\YER TO APPELLANTS' POINT II. 
THE RESPONDENTS DID RELY UPON THE CLAIMED 
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND 
THE JURY SO FOUND. 
rnder point two of appellants' brief, only a small 
part of the testimony touching the reliance placed upon 
plaintiffs alleged false representations is quoted. Upon 
that phase of the case, defendant Clara A. White testified 
that at the time :Mr. Lewis made the first visit to Farm-
ington "he told me that he would like to see me have the 
motel; that I could make more rnoney there, I could 
make a thousand dollars a month, clear. He told me it 
was producing a thousand dollars a month at that time. 
He wasn't making so much out of it becuse all the time 
he had rented it, leased it, and he only got $350.00 a 
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1nonth for the monthly payments on the lease; that was 
the first time that Mr. Lewis can1e up." (Tr. 47-48) 
rrhat she had a conversation with Mr. Lewis both times 
he wa~ up to Farmington about the income of the· motel; 
"that at the second time he said he knew I would make 
a thousand dollars a month down there." * * * "he told 
1ne it had produced that. * * * :Miss Carruth when she 
wa:-; there made that place pay, and she had made a 
thousand dollars a month, but he didn't get much out 
of it becuse he only rented it to her, he had leased it to 
her and he got the $350.00 a month, and she never failed 
to pay it, but he knew she was making a great deal more 
than that." (Tr. 49-50) That Mr. Lewis told her that 
l\Ir. Lyons was in charge of the place and she could get 
any additional information from him; that when she 
talked to l\Ir. Lyons, he told her that there were seven 
1nen staying at the motel and each paid $2.50 per day. 
(Tr. 50) In answer to the question "Now did you believe 
and rely upon what Mr. Lewis told you about the income 
from this motel?" Mrs. White answered, "I most cer-
tainly did, after being repeated several times." Upon 
being asked, '"Would you have bought this place if you 
had known it wasn't producing that amount?" She 
answered, "Oh, my no." Mrs. White further testified 
that she told Mr. Lewis that she had no means to pay 
for the motel except what she could make in operating 
the motel. (Tr. 51) It should be noted that Mr. Lewis 
admitted that Mrs. White so informed him. (Tr. 357) 
Mrs. White was cross-examined at some length, but 
her testimony was the same as on her direct examination. 
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She did ~ay "there wa~ a minute's doubt in 1ny n1ind 
"·hen he tir~t told 1ne th~1t. but after repeatedly telling 
me, ·why I belieyed it." (Tr. 59) :Jln~. \Vhite was further 
asked about her testinHmy given on a deposition when 
she testified that she didn't re1nmnber what she said 
when :Mr. Lewis told her \Yhat the nwtel was bringing 
in, but that she probably laughed at him, that she did 
not know why she probably laughed at 1fr. Lewis, but 
when he told her over and over again she believed hin1. 
(Tr. 60-61) 
The defendant Kathryn Grange White testified that 
she didn't believe the statement about the motel bring-
ing in a thousand dollars a month when such statement 
was first 1nade by ~Ir. Lewis; that she changed her mind 
because :Jir. Lewis kept repeating it. (Tr. 303) On 
cross-exanlination she testified that she did count the 
number of times :Jir. Lewis repeated the amount of in-
come produced by the motel before she believed him; 
(Tr. 308) that she started believing him when he so 
stated the third time and after he stated it the fourth 
time, she did believe him. (Tr. 308) We shall have more 
to say about the matter of the defendants believing the 
statements about the income derived from the motel in 
connecion with our discussion of point three of appel-
lants' brief. If the evidence to which we have directed 
the attention of the court does not support the finding 
of the jury that the defendants relied upon the state-
ments of the plaintiffs, it is difficult to conceive of a 
case which will support such a finding. 
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ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT THREE 
THE RESPONDENTS HAD A RIGHT TO RELY UPON 
THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY APPELLANTS. 
Under their point three, plaintiffs contend and cite 
cases which they claim show that the defendants had no 
right to rely on the representations made by the plain-
tiffs as to the income derived from the motel. 
At the outset we quote from some of the authorities 
dealing with the question of the right to rely on repre-
sentations made by one who seeks to sell his property. 
Tlie right to rely on representations made by a 
seller of property is discussed at some length in 23 Am. 
Jur. 947, et seq., Sec. 146. At page 948 of the above 
volume it is said that: 
"The policy of the courts is, on the one hand, 
to suppress fraud and, on the other, not to en-
courage negligence and inattention to one's own 
interest. The rule of law is one of policy. Is it 
better to encourage negligence in the foolish or 
fraud in the deceitful? Either course has obvious 
dangers. But judicial experience exemplifies that 
the former is the less objectionable and hampers 
less the administration of pure justice. The law 
is not designed to protect the vigilant, or toler-
ably vigilant, alone, although it rather favors 
them, but is intended as a protection to even the 
foolishly credulous, as against the machinations 
of the designedly wicked. It has also been fre-
quently declared that as between the original 
parties, one who has intentionally deceived the 
other to his prejudice is not to be heard to say, 
in defense of the charge of fraud, that the inno-
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cent party ought not to have trusted him or was 
guilty of negligence in so doing. The· courts, 
however, are not entirely in accord as to the 
circumstances under which fraudulent representa-
tions may be relied on, although it cannot perhaps 
be denied that negligence as a defense in cases 
of fraud has been in danger of being pushed too 
far. There would seem to be no doubt that while, 
in the ordinary business transactions of life, men 
are expected to exercise reasonable prudence, 
and not to rely upon others, with whom they deal, 
to care for and protect their interest, this require-
ment is not to be carried so far that the law shall 
ignore or protect positive, intentional fraud suc-
cessfully practiced upon the simple-minded or 
unwary." 
Of the smne import is the law announced in 37 C.J. 
Sec. 102, page 406 et seq. 
We shall not review the numerous cases cited in 
the footnotes, but shall direct the court's attention to 
two cases which show the trend of judicial authority. 
In the case of Morrison v. Goodspeed, et al.~ 100 Colo. 
470; 68 Pac. 2d 459, it is held: 
"Where n1isrepresen tation is such as would 
tend to induce a party to enter into contract, 
or would be part of inducement, inference is that 
he acted on inducement, unless he knew facts 
or avowedly did not rely on misrepresentations, 
since one making false representation in respect 
of material matter to rely on defense that tran-
saction was not entered into on faith of repre-
sentation must be able to prove that there was no 
reliance on representation." 
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The foregoing quotation is from the syllabus which 
reflects the opinion of the Court. 
ln the case of Carpenter et al. v. Hamilton, 62 Pac. 
(2d) 1397 cited on page 12 of appellants' brief, it is said 
that: 
"Purchasers of realty had right to rely on 
representations made by vendor concerning mat-
ters of fact which were unknown to them, without 
making inquiry concerning truth thereof, and 
vendor could not evade consequences of any 
fraudulent statements he may have made by 
showing that means of knowledge of truth were 
easily available to purchaser." 
The foregoing quotation is likewise from the syl-
labus and reflects the doctrine announced in the opinion. 
In this case the appellants not only failed to offer 
any evidence that respondents did not rely on the rep-
resentations 1nade by appellants, but such evidence as 
they did offer shows that the respondents had a right 
to rely on such misrepresentations particularly as to 
the arnount of income that may have been derived from 
the motel. Thus plaintiff, Clyde C. Lewis, when he was 
called the second time testified in effect that the property 
should rent for $600.00 a month; that if the lessee got 
$400.00 a month that should be sufficient. (Tr. 356-357) 
Mr. Lyons, one of the plaintiffs' witnesses testified 
that the property should bring in a thousand dollars 
a month. (Tr. 320) Mr. Jensen, one of counsel for plain-
tiffs and a witness called in behalf of the plaintiffs, testi-
fied that $1000.00 a 1nonth is less than the property 
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should bring in. (Tr. 390) Indeed, after allowing for 
:25 to 30 per cent for Yaemwy, he placed the probable 
amount of incon1e at $-l:-l-70.00 with a net incorne of 
$3SC)U.Ul) per year. ( Tr. ~iSO-~)Sl) Indeed, by using the 
motel for a maternity hmne or a hmne for old people 
or for B.Y.r. students, .Jlr. Jensen would have far in 
excess of that anwunt. (Tr. 390-391) 
Thmnas \Y. Davies placed the probable incmne of 
the rnotel at $1565.00 per nwnth. (Tr. 37) In light of 
this testimony, is it any wonder that the defendants 
relied upon the staternents of plaintiffs. Apparently 
any one of the expert witnesses called by the plaintiffs 
would have been taken in by the statements as to the 
income that \Yas and had been produced. We can find 
nothing in the cases cited by the appellants that indicates 
that defendants were without right to rely upon the 
representations n1ade by the plaintiff. 
Of course, if one goes and exarnines property as 
was done in the case of Carpenter v. Hamilton, cited by 
appellants, and sees that the floors of the building were 
uneven and other visible defects existed in the building, 
the purchaser could not be heard to say that he relied 
upon representations which were contrary to the obvious 
facts. There was nothing in what the defendants saw 
which may be said to prevent the motel from bringing 
in the income of $1000.00 per month. Quite the con-
trary as is testified to by the witnesses for the plaintiff 
to whose evidence we have heretofore directed the court. 
Surely the defendants had a right to rely upon the rep-
resentations made by the plaintiffs without holding up 
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the deal until they were able to locate Miss Carruth, 
which might have consumed weeks or months as appar-
ently no one knew where she could be found. We again 
direct the attention of the court to the fact that when 
the witnesses testified to the damages, such testimony 
was limited to the fact that the property was not pro-
ducing the income which plaintiffs represented it was 
producing. 
On page 16 of appellants' brief, it is said that sub-
sequent to the time respondents were told that the motel 
was and had been producing one thousand dollars per 
month, they learned the property was producing a little 
over one-half the amount represented. So far as this 
record shows, the motel never did produce a little over 
one-half the amount represented, but only a little over 
one-third of the amount represented. Moreover, de-
fendants did not learn that the property did not have an 
income of $1000.00 per month until long after they signed 
the contract. As we read the Carpenter case upon which 
appellants seem to so strongly rely when applied to the 
evidence in this case makes against and not in favor of 
appellants' contention. 
ANSVVERING POINT FOUR OF APPELLANTS' 
BRIEF 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY ON RIGHT TO RELY. 
As is held by the cases cited, both the appellants and 
respondents under point three of appellants' brief, the 
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respondents had a right to rely upon the representations 
made by the appellant~. 
In the ea~e of Stanley Tnu .. ·t Co. v. Elery, 22 Pac. 
{2d) G72, it is said that the pleadings and evidence in 
that ea~e justified the sub1nission of the question of the 
right of the purchaser of the property there involved 
to rely upon the representations 1nade to such pur-
chaser. In this case there are no facts pleaded and no 
evidence was received tending to show that defendants 
did not have a right to rely on the representations made 
to the1n. ~-\_s is held in the case of Morris on v. Goodspeed 
supra, the burden was on the plaintiffs to establish that 
the defendants did not rely on the representations made 
to them. The appellants failed to allege or offer any 
proof that the defendants did not rely on the statements 
made to them. Defendants testified that they did rely 
upon such statements. The fact that Mrs. White had 
no income to pay the installments provided for in the 
contract except such as was produced by the motel, 
which fact plaintiff Clyde C. Lewis admitted she con-
veyed to him, and the further fact as testified to by 
plaintiff and his expert witness to the fact that the 
property should produce an income of $1000.00 per 
month, all show that defendants had a right, as a matter 
of law, to rely on the representations made to them. 
Moreover, the request made by the plaintiffs with 
respect to the right of the defendants to rely upon the 
representations was not only apparently made after 
the verdict was reduced, but the request is fatally de-
fective. 
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In plaintiffs' request for instructions to the Jury 
there appears this language : 
''-±. You are instructed that even if the 
plaintiff, Clyde Lewis, made the statements that 
the income from the motel was one thousand dol-
lars a month, prior to the signing of the contract, 
if you find from the evidence, that the defendants 
had reasonable opportunity to determine the 
truth or falsity of said statement, they had no 
right to rely upon the statements and are not 
entitled to damages for such false statement." 
Such an instruction to the jury is so general as to 
be of no value to the jury. What is meant by reasonable 
opportunity? Does it mean that the defendants had no 
right to rely upon the representations made by the plain-
tiffs and to enter into a contract in reliance thereon until 
they had ascertained where Miss Carruth was and found 
out fron1 Miss Carruth what she had to say about the 
income she had received. We have not found a case, 
and none has been cited by appellants, that lays down 
any such a requirement. It has frequently been held 
by this court that it is error to give general instructions 
because they are calculated to mislead the jury and that 
instructions should be made applicable to the evidence. 
Belnap v. Widdison, 32 Utah 246, 90 Pac. 197; Farmers 
& Merchants Bank v. Jensen, 64 Utah 609, 232 Pac. 1084; 
Jensen v. Utah Light and Ry. Co., 42 Utah 415, 132 Pac. 
8; Everts v. Warrell, 58 Utah 238, 197 Pac. 1043. If, for 
example, the plaintiffs claimed it was the duty of the 
defendants to seek out l\1iss Carruth and ascertain from 
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her the incon1e of the nwtel, they should have so re-
quested. \Y e haYe no doubt but that such an instruction 
would have been error, and yet that seen1s to be the 
only thing ~ngge~ted that defendants should have done 
that they did not do. 
~-\XS\YERIXU POlXT FIYE OF APPELLANTS' 
BRIEF 
THE FINDINGS OF THE JURY THAT THE VALUE 
OF THE ~IOTEL PROPERTY WAS $42,000.00 HAD IT 
BEEN AS REPRESENTED IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
The price fixed by the tenns of the con tract was 
$±2,500.00. (See plaintiffs' Exhibit A) The plaintiff 
Clyde C. Lewis testified that he should be getting about 
$600.00 a month for the property; that $400.00 a month 
should pay for all operating expenses; (Tr. 357) that 
the reasonable market value at the time it was sold was 
the price for which it was sold. (Tr. 21) Mr. Butter-
worth, a witness called by the plaintiffs, testified that in 
his opinion the motel was worth $42,000.00 as of April 
26, 1949. (Tr. 29±) 
Mr. Jensen, one of counsel for the plaintiffs, some-
what hesitatingly testified that a building with an income 
of $1000.00 per month would run around $42,000.00. (Tr. 
242) Thomas A. Heal, a witness called by defendants, 
testified that if the property sold for and was worth 
$42,500.00 with an income of $1000.00 per month, it would 
be, in his opinion, worth $14,166.00 if the Income was 
$350.00 per month. (Tr. 172-195) 
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Mr. Atwood, a witness called by the defendants, 
testified that if the motel had an income of $350.00 a 
Inonth, it would have a market value of $14,165.00, if it 
had an. income of $1000.00 a month it would not be far 
out to put the market value at $42,500.00. (Tr. 147-148) 
Ralph Halm, a witness called by the defendants, 
testified that if the motel was producing $1000.00 per 
month, it would, in his opinion, be worth about $42,000.00. 
(Tr. 242) It will be seen that all of the witnesses of 
both the plaintiffs and defendants were of the opinion 
that if the motel was producing $1000.00 per month, 
its probable value at the time the contract was entered 
into was $42,000.00, or $42,500.00 the amount for which 
it sold. 
Counsel for plaintiffs have cited cases such as De-
Freitas v. Town of Suisun, 149 Pac. 553 which holds 
that the income produced by property is not conclusive 
of Inarket value. We have no quarrel with the doctrine 
there announced. None of the witnesses who testified 
made the claim that market value was determined exclu-
sively by its income. They did testify that income was 
a very important element in fixing market value. All 
of the witnesses who testified as to market value had 
examined the motel and from such examination, their 
familiarity with values together with the income derived 
from the motel and the cost of operation, etc., they fixed 
the market value. That is, as we understand, the proper, 
if not the only way, to determine market value. 
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ANS\VERlNG APPELLANTS' POINT SIX 
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT WAIVED THEIR ACTION 
FOR FRAUD. 
Appellants' clain1 that respondents have waived 
the fraud perpetrated upon then1 is without support in 
either the evidence or the pleadings. 
It is, of course, elementary that before one may 
be held to have waived a right for damages sustained 
on account of fraud perpetrated upon hi1n, he must have 
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud. Such 
doctrine is recognized by all of the cases cited by plain-
tiffs in support of their sixth point. 
The law with respect to waiver of fraud is thus 
stated in 2-! Am. J ur. page 34, Sec. 209 : 
"If with full knowledge of the fraud a de-
frauded party intentionally waives or condones 
it, he cannot thereafter claim damages for the 
fraud. To invoke the rule of waiver, however, 
it has been held to be essential to show that the 
defrauded party intentionally condoned the fraud 
affirmed the contract and abandoned all right to 
recover damages for the fraud, with full knowl-
edge thereof. The affirmance must be equivalent 
to ratification. The question of outright waiver 
is one of intent and it is essential to such waiver 
that the victim possess full knowledge of the 
fraud practiced upon him and that he intends to 
affirm the contract and abandon his right to re-
cover damages for the loss resulting from fraud. 
Hence to constitute such a waiver in any case, 
the defrauded party must act with full knowledge 
of his rights, and of the material facts constitut-
ing the fraud." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
50 
\Ve again call the attention of the Court to the testi-
mony of ~1 rs. White in so far as the same may shed 
light on her knowledge of the falsity of the representa-
tions made to her about the income of the motel at the 
ti1ne it is elaimed she waived her right to maintain an 
action for fraud. 
On cross-examination, .Mrs. White was asked: 
''Q. Did ~·ou ask him (I\lr. Lewis) where l\fiss 
Carruth was~ 
A. K o, I don't think I did. 
Q. You doubted his statement about the fact 
that it could earn a thousand dollars a month, 
yet you ~ay you didn't ask him where Miss 
Carruth was ·~ 
A. No. 
Q. You weren't interested in talking to Miss 
Carruth about how much she made~ 
A. I was only interested in what he was telling 
me. 
Q. \Yell, he told you l\1.iss Carruth had made a 
thousand dollars. Now I say you weren't 
interested in talking with Miss Carruth per-
sonally to find out what she had made, you 
weren't interested in that, were you~ 
A. At the time I don't think anyone knew where 
she was. 
Q. Did you ask Mr. Lewis where she was~ 
A. No, I have asked many other people where 
she was, but she wasn't in Utah. 
Q. When did you ask other people where she 
was~ 
A. Different conversations with my neighbors. 
Q. Prior to the signing of the contract, whom 
did you ask~ 
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~\. I c.ouldn't reme1nber the people. 
Q. Did you ask ~lr. Lyon'? 
A. No, I don't know that I did. 
Q. And you didn't ask Mr. Lewis Y 
_\, Xo.'' 
There were other questions and answers of similar 
import. (Tr. 80) She was then asked: "Mrs. White 
c.an you say now of your own knowledge that this motel 
never brought into the owner of it a thousand dollars 
per 1nonth '? ~\. X o.'' Further she testified that she 
was told the 1notel brought in a thousand dollars a month 
and that is all she knew. (Tr. 81) She further testified 
that when she first went into the motel the main high-
way was not torn up; that the highway was torn up on 
.May 15th and remained torn up until Oc.tober; that while 
the highway was torn up, it was nec.essary to go around 
to the bac.k to get into the motel; that the fact that the 
road was torn up 1nay have affected the income of the 
motel; (Tr. 82) that the road was finished about October 
1st; that notwithstanding the road was torn up, she 
made her payments quite regularly, but in October the 
pipe plant shut down and she lost her boarders. 
(Tr. 83) Mrs. White was also asked: "Did you ever 
contact Miss Carruth to find out whether or not there 
was insulation~ A. No, I never talked to Miss Car-
ruth." (Tr. 97) 
Mrs. White was asked on her cross-examination 
these questions and she gave these answers: 
"Q. Mrs. White, did you ever after this contract 
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was signed ask for an extension of time in 
which to make payments~ 
A. T don't know just what you mean, an exten-
sion of time. 
Q. Well, if you are not able to make a payment 
say on the 20th, did you ever ask to make it 
on the 30th or the next month~ 
A. Yes, I have talked with Mr. Lewis about that. 
Q. Did you ever talk to Mr. Jensen at any time 
about extending the time for payment~ 
A. The only time I talked to Mr. Jensen was 
after I had received a notice of eviction, that 
I wasn't keeping my payments up. I went 
to the office and tried to fix things with him 
and let me have a chance to pay up. I think 
at that time I only had one boarder in the 
house. 
Q. Was that after the first notice in May~ 
A. I don't remember just when it was. 
Q. Did Mr. Jensen agree to give you more time~ 
A. No, he said he would talk with l\1:r. Lewis. 
He doubted he would do it or not. 
Q. Did he ever get in touch with you thereafter 
with regard to a different arrangement~ 
A. No. I had to borrow money to go and pay 
him; that arrangement was made. 
Q. When you came into Mr. Jensen's office 
wasn't something discussed about the pay-
ment of $100.00 a week until the arrears were 
paid~ 
A. Yes, I tried to get him to let me pay it that 
way and he said Mr. Lewis wouldn't do it, 
he knew he wouldn't. 
Q. Didn't Mr. Jensen write you it would be all 
right to do that~ 
A. No, sir." 
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~he further testified that ~he had the privilege to 
pay $100.00 a 'Yeek after she had the payment8 all caught 
up. (Tr. 109) On further ero~~-examination, Mrs. White 
testified that she was not given any terms by Mr. Jensen 
to pay up what ~he was behind in her payments, but 
that her attorney :J[r. Dalton paid nwney that was in 
arrears on the contract. (Tr. 112) There was received 
in evidence a receipt, Defendants' Exhibit 3, which re-
cites June 1:2, 1950 received frmn Clara A. White, paid 
by Don :Jlack Dalton, Sixteen Hundred Ninety-four and 
14/100 Dollars ($1694.14), Reinstatement of Contract 
of Clara ~-\.. \Yhite and Kathryn Grange White with 
Clyde C. Lewis for purchase of motel at Pleasant Grove. 
Perris S. Jensen. 
:Jiiss Carruth testified that she first met :Mrs. White 
when the Subpoena was served upon her to appear at 
the trial, which was one week ago Saturday. 
The foregoing testimony is all that we can find in 
the record which has any bearing on the 1natter of whe-
ther or not ~Irs. White had any knowledge of the falsity 
of the representations made to her. Needless to say, 
such evidence falls far short of showing, or for that 
matter, tending to show that Mrs. White had full knowl-
edge of the misrepresentations made to her at the time 
she paid the $1694.14 on the installments that according 
to the contract were past due. 
At this point we digress to remark that we do not 
concede that the payment of the $1694.14 was to rein-
state the contract for the simple reason that the contract 
was never legally revoked, nor were the plaintiffs en-
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titled to take possession by reason of the service of the 
notice of eviction. Much less may it be said that the 
plaintiffs conferred upon the defendants any favor by 
relieving them of $1694.14 on the contract which had 
been secured by misrepresentation. We shall have more 
to say about this phase of the case later on in this brief. 
At this point suffice it to say that none of the cases cited 
under Point 6 of appellants' brief and the claim of the 
appellants to the effect that the respondents waived the 
fraud are applicable here, because of a total failure of 
evidence that the respondents knew the facts constitut-
ing the misrepresentations at the time of the transaction 
with respect to paying the installments that were in 
arrears. 
Moreover there is no pleading alleging that the 
defendants had waived the fraud claimed by them, nor 
did plaintiffs request the court to amend their pleadings 
to allege any such a claim. 
Counsel for the appellants recognize the necessity 
of pleading and proving waiver of a fraud, but claim 
that the pleadings may be amended in this Court. No 
case is cited from this jurisdiction where such a practice 
has been permitted, and we believe none can be found. 
On the contrary, this court has repeatedly and so far 
as we can find has uniformly held that it may review 
only such matters as are presented to the trial court 
and it may not consider or review matters which are 
presented for the first time in this court. Among the 
cases so holding are: Simpson v. Denver afl'l-d R. G. R. Co., 
43 Utah 105, 134 Pac. 883; Smith v. Sinal ad Lood & 
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Fruit Co._. -1~ rtah -1-13, 1~3~ Pac. 3;)ti: Stcwt v. Halt Lake 
and 0. R. Co., -11 Utah 318, 1~7 Pae. ~()7; ll' oolf v. Guy, 
4S rtah ~39, 158 Pac. ISS: United States Buildi.ng & 
Loan Assn. Y. Jlidrale Home Finance Corp., 86 Utah 
506, -1-1 Pac. (~d) 1090. 
Appellants seen1 to deriYe son1e comfort fron1 the 
provisions of Rule 15b of lTtah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
That rule an1ong other things provides that : 
"If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
grotmd that it is not within the issues made by 
the pleadings, the Court may allow the pleadings 
to be amended 'vhen the presentation of the 
1nerits of the action will be subserved thereby 
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the Court 
that the admission of such evidence would pre-
judice hin1 in maintaining his action or defense 
upon the merits. The Court shall grant a con-
tinuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting 
party to meet such evidence." 
Near the conclusion of the trial, defendant Clyde C. 
Lewis was again called and by his attorney asked: 
"Q. i\Ir. Lewis, after .Jirs. White took possession 
of the property and she became in arrears 
on her payments, did she at any time come 
and ask for an extension of the time of pay-
ment~ 
A. Yes she did. 
Q. Do you recall when that was~ 
A. Well after she had been there a short time 
she got in arrears. 
Q. About when was it she came to you~ 
~IR. HANSEN : If the Court please, we 
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object to this testimony as heing immaterial. 
'Vhat difference does it make~ 
MR. RICHARDS: This is material because 
if there have been any favors after the discovery 
of fraud, then the favors asked for and granted 
is a waiver of the fraud. That is why it is mate-
rial. 
MR. HANSEN: No such pleading is made. 
~1:R. RICHARDS: We don't need to, all we 
need to do is show that in rebuttal." (Tr. 370) 
Later on counsel for defendants stated that: "I wish 
the record to show if counsel seeks to establish a waiver 
of any fraud the pleadings fail to allege that, and having 
failed to allege it is not an issue in this case." 
THE COURT: Objection sustained. (Tr. 372) 
No request was made to amend the pleadings to set 
up a waiver. The only other mention of the waiver was 
when the court asked counsel for the plaintiffs if they 
had any objection to the court's instructions to the jury, 
and counsel for the plaintiffs stated that: "The plaintiffs 
except to the Court's ruling denying the plaintiffs the 
right to show that the defendants, after having knowl-
edge of the fraud, requested an extension of time for pay-
ment of delinquent payments, for the purpose of showing 
that defendants waived the fraud, if any." (Tr. 408) 
It will be observed that under Rule 15b when objec-
tion is Inade to evidence because not within the issue the 
procedure provided for by the rule is to seek an amend-
ment of the pleadings. That was not done and there can 
be no valid basis for complaint on account of pleadings 
not having been mnended when there is no request to 
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amend. Probably these conunent~ are not nece8~ary be-
cause appellants 1nake no cmnplaint directed to such pro-
ceedings, but their claim is that the transcript of the evi-
" dence of ~Irs. \Yhite shows a waiYer. \Ye have already 
directed the attention of the Court to such evidence and 
we subnrit that by no stretch of her evidence n1ay it be 
said that defendants waived the fraud. :Moreover, if 
there were son1e evidence tending to show a waiver of the 
fraud, the defendants would have had a right to have 
such question subn1itted to the jury for its determination. 
There being no issue raised by the pleadings on the 
question of waiver, there was nothing to submit to the 
jury on any such matter. 
From what we have said, we do not concede that if 
plaintiffs had been able to show that Mrs. White asked 
for additional time to pay the amount she was in arrears 
after she discovered the fraud that she would thereby 
have waived the fraud. The authorities as we read them 
require either a new agreement or a substantial conces-
sion before the defrauded person may be said to have 
waived the fraud, even if such person has full knowledge 
of the fraud. We have heretofore cited the authorities 
touching that phase of the case. 
We have heretofore discussed this case with the end 
in view of showing that the trial court did not err in any 
of the particulars urged by the appellants. It may be that 
we should let the matter rest there, but we are mindful 
that the courts do not always accept the theory of a case 
which is adopted by appellants. At times appellate, as 
well as trial courts, dispose of a case on a theory other 
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tltan that advanced by counsel. For fear the court may 
adopt a theory of this case not in accord with that which 
apparently appellants have proceeded on, we shall dis-
cuss this case from the point of view which the defend-
ants believe to be correct, and which the trial court ap-
parently adopted in part at least in disposing of the 
cause. 
At the outset it should be kept in mind that the jury 
was requested to and did find a special verdict on all of 
the issues submitted to them and that neither of the par-
ties were denied the right to have the jury pass on any 
question of fact. It is, of course, elementary that when a 
jury returns a special verdict finding the facts, it then 
becomes the province of the court to determine the law 
applicable to the facts so found. 
In this case the defendants in their counterclaim 
alleged that the plaintiffs represented to the defendants 
that the motel was and had been producing $1000.00 per 
n1onth, when in truth and in fact it was not and had not 
been producing more than $225.00 per month, and that 
because of such misrepresentations, the defendants had 
been damaged in the sum of $30,000.00. The jury found 
that the defendants did make the misrepresentations in 
conformity with plaintiffs' allegations and evidence. 
It is the general rule of law which has been followed 
in this State that the measure of damages which a pur-
chaser upon whom a fraud has been perpetrated is the 
difference in actual market value of the property at the 
time of its purchase and what its value would have been 
if it had been as represented. Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah 
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408: -!S Pac. 37. Ken near r. Pro·u·s, 81 Utah 135; 16 Pac. 
(2d) 1094. ~-\defrauded purehaser, however, is not limit-
ed in his reeovery to such difference in value. He may 
recover all dmnages, including special damages, which 
are the natural and proxilnate result of the- fraud per-
petrated upon hin1. The law is thus stated in 37 C.J.S., 
page 470: 
"The general rule applicable to the measure 
of damages for fraud is that such an amount 
should be awarded to plaintiff as will compensate 
hun for the loss occasioned by the fraud or as it 
has been expresse-d plaintiff is entitled to recover 
damages adequate to the injury which he has sus-
tained. Plaintiff can recover the entire amount 
of his loss occasioned by the fraud, but the re-
covery must be limited to the actual loss. The 
number of false representations made does not 
affect the measure of damages." 
Xumerous cases are cited in the foot notes to the text 
in support of the text, but as the rule announced by the 
text is the law applicable to torts generally, we shall not 
burden the court with a review of the same. See also 27 
C.J. 83-84 and cases cited in note 86. 
In light of the fact that the motel was by the Court 
awarded to the plaintiffs, it may be doubted if the differ-
ence in the actual market value of the property and its 
value if it had been as represented is of controlling im-
portance. The defendants have lost the entire property 
and thus its value has ceased to be of any concern to them. 
What they have actually lost is the money they paid 
on the property and the difference in the income which 
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they actually received from the property and the amount 
they would have received if the rnotel was and had beeu 
producing the income represented. 
We shall devote the remainder of this Brief to a dis-
cussion of fact found by the jury from that point of view. 
Respondents are not seeking a reversal or modifi-
cation of the decree and judgment, but they do wish to 
present certain matters in the nature of cross assign-
ments of errors in support of the judgment appealed 
from. 
RESPONDENTS' POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY APPARENTLY HOLD-
ING THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO DECLARE 
A FORFEITURE OF THE CONTRACT. 
RESPONDENTS' POINT TWO 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVING BROUGHT THEIR ACTION 
FOR POSSESSION OF THE MOTEL AND HAVING SE-
CURED AND RETAINED A DECREE AWARDING THEM 
THE MOTEL, DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A JUDG-
MENT FOR THE MONEY PAID AS A PART OF THE PUR-
CHASE PRICE OF THE MOTEL TOGETHER WITH THE 
DAMAGE WHICH THEY SUSTAINED BECAUSE OF THE 
MISREPRESENTATION AS TO THE INCOME FROM THE 
MOTEL. 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS' 
POINTS 
RESPONDENTS' POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY APPARENTLY HOLD-
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lNG THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO DECLARE 
A FORFEITURE OF THE CONTRACT. 
By their cmnplaint the plaintiffs sought to secure a 
forfeiture of all of the rights of the defendants in and to 
the contract for the purchase of the motel. The provi-
sions upon which they rely for their claimed right to de-
clare a forfeiture is contained in a Uniform Sales Con-
tract such as in conunon use here in Salt Lake and Utah 
generally. \Ye have heretofore in this brief quoted the 
provision so relied upon by the plaintiffs. In their an-
swer the defendants alleged that the provision relied 
upon by the plaintiffs for their claimed right to declare 
a forfeiture was and is void because the same consti-
tutes a penalty and as such is against public policy. In 
light of the fact that this court has very recently, in the 
case of Spencer 1/.Perkins,not yet reported,construed and 
passed upon the same provision as that relied upon by the 
plaintiffs herein, we shall be content to refer to that case 
where the other cases from this jurisdiction dealing with 
the question of a forfeiture as distinguished from liqui-
dated damages are collected. Suffice it to say that the 
facts in this case bring it within the rule that to permit 
the plaintiffs to declare a forfeiture would constitute 
a penalty and not liquidated damages. It will be seen 
that if the plaintiffs should be permitted to declare a 
forfeiture, such claimed right accrued the instant the 
first installment of $31.50 became past due and owing 
for thirty days. To appr<?ve the right to declare a for-
feiture under such circumstance has repeatedly been 
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condemned by this court as will be seen from the case of 
S]Jencer v. Perkins, supra, and the cases there cited. 
It may be that it is not of controlling importance 
in this case to determine whether or not the contract 
between the parties thereto was or was not subject to 
forfeiture. That is to say, if the contract became sub-
ject to forfeiture because of the failure of the defendants 
to keep up the installment payments, such failure was 
brought about because of the fraud perpetrated upon 
the defendants by the plaintiffs in that if the motel was 
and had been producing only about 1/3 of the income 
that plaintiffs represented, the inability of the defend-
ants to Ineet the payment was directly brought about by 
the misrepresentations of the plaintiffs. Obviously if the 
property was and had been producing an income of 
$1000.00 per month, it in all probability would have con-
tinued to produce a similar income and if it had produced 
such income the defendants would have had no difficulty 
in making the installment payments. On the other hand, 
if, as both the defendant J\1rs. White and the plaintiff 
Clyde C. Lewis testified, that Mrs. White had no income 
or means to meet the installment payments except such 
as could be secured from the income of the motel, it 
became an absolute certainty that the defendants could 
not meet the installment payments because the install-
ment payments amounted to more than the income, all of 
which the defendant Clyde C. Lewis admitted the second 
time he was on the witness stand, but still he, according 
to further admission, did not convey such information 
to the defendants. Under such circumstances, part of 
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the damage suffered by the defendants wa~ t lw down 
payment on the nwtel. 
Before concluding this phase of the case, it may be 
observed that the defendants, at the conclusion of the 
case, did not resist the awarding of the uwtel to the plain-
tiffs if the defendants could be awarded the dmnages 
which they had sustained. 
RESPONDEXTS' POINT TWO 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVING BROUGHT THEIR ACTION 
FOR POSSESSION OF THE MOTEL AND HAVING SE-
CURED AND RETAINED A DECREE AWARDING THEM 
THE MOTEL, DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A JUDG-
MENT FOR THE MONEY PAID AS A PART OF THE PUR-
CHASE PRICE OF THE MOTEL TOGETHER WITH THE 
DAMAGE WHICH THEY SUSTAINED BECAUSE OF THE 
MISREPRESENTATION AS TO THE INCOME FROM THE 
MOTEL. 
The defendants in this case are not seeking to be 
restored to the possession of the premises. What the 
defendants do claim is that the plaintiffs did not have 
and do not have a right to a forfeiture of the payments 
that the defendants made on the contract, but on the con-
trary, the defendants are entitled to be reimbursed for 
the money paid on the contract as a part of their dam-
ages. In other words, the plaintiffs have committed an 
anticipatory breach of their contract by refusing to be 
bound by the contract and having secured and retained 
a decree awarding them the motel and the personal prop-
erty therein contained, the defendants are entitled to 
have awarded to then1, as a part of their damages, the 
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money which they paid on the contract. The authorities 
are generally to the effect that a cancellation of a con-
t rad before the time for performance, which amounts to 
a refusal to perfonn it at any time, gives the adverse 
part the option to treat the entire contract as broken 
and to sue immediately for damages or for a total breach. 
12 Am. Jur. 970. To the same effect see 17 C.J.S., page 
973. N mnerous cases from both Federal and State courts 
which support the text are cited in foot notes among 
which is the case of Jordan v. Mads en, et al., 69 Utah 
11 :2 ; :25:2 Pac. 570. 
The defendants however will still be reimbursed for 
only a part of the damages which they have sustained 
by being awarded merely the money that they paid on 
the property. It is a matteT of common knowledge that 
the income from commercial or income producing prop-
erty remains substantially the same in the absence of 
some economic or physical change. In this case the 
plaintiffs having represented that the property was and 
had been producing an income of a $1000.00 per month, 
the defendants had a right to rely on such representa-
tions, and so relying and believing that the property 
would continue to produce substantially such income· for 
at least a reasonable time thereafter. The defendants 
remained in possession of the property from May 1, 1949 
to the date of the judgment which was signed on October 
4, 1951, a period of 29 months and 4 days. During that 
period of time if the property had produced an income 
of $1000.00 per month as represented instead of the ac-
tual income of $350.00 per month, or $650.00 per month 
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~ more than the actual inc01ne, or a total for the ~~) uwnths 
'~ and .f days of $18,93-!.00, this added to the amount paid 
m· down on the property of $10,:25ti.~l auwunts to $29,190.-
~ 21. In addition to that the defendants paid on the install-
ments the stun of $33-±4.1-± (R. 7) and spent in enlarg-
ing the kitchen and fruit roo1n the su1u of $700.00 of her 
own money. 
Before concluding our discussion of the foregoing 
figures, we digress to observe that in those cases where 
a defendant establishes a right to recover on a counter-
claim, the usual practice is to set off the amount re-
covered on the counterclaim fron1 the amount recovered, 
if any, on the Complaint. Such is, in proper cases, the 
practice approved by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 13 c, i and j. So also do the Rules of Civil Proced-
ure, Table III, pp. 187-188 provide that: 
"On and after the effective date of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure the provisions of Title 
104, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 as amended 
(Code of Civil Procedure), will have no further 
force and effect except the following which are 
retained by law." 
Among the laws enumerated which are to be retained 
is Chapter 60, Forceable Entry and Detainer (See page 
188). It would thus seem that while a Counterclaim for 
fraud may be set up in an action for unlawful detainer, 
a judgment recovered for fraud in the procurement of 
the contract which is the basis of the action for unlawful 
detainer, cannot defeat such action, for unlawful de-
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tainer or even be set up as a counterclaim except for the 
purposes of the trial. Such Reems to have been the doc-
trine entertained by the trial court when it rendered 
it8 oral decision. (R. 411) Such also seems to be the 
law in this juri8dictionas announced in suchcaseasDunbar 
r. Hansen, GS [tah 398, 250 Pac. 982. Be that as it may, 
it will be noted that the amount of the money judgment 
finally entered by the court below in favor of the defend-
ants was the amount as found by the jury as the differ-
ence in the actual value of the property and what its 
value would have been if its income had been as repre-
sented, less the amount owing on the contract at the 
time plaintiff sought to declare a forfeiture, also less 
three times the rental value from the time of the attempt-
ed cancellation of the con tract to the date of the trial. 
Thus the verdict of the jury found that on the date the 
contract was executed, the actual value of the property 
was $14,000.00 and that if it had been producing an in-
cOine of $1000.00 per month as represented, it would 
have been worth $42,000.00. The difference is thus $28,-
000.00. The defendants were in arrears on their install-
Inent payments at the time the plaintiffs sought a for-
feiture of the contract in the sum of $1087.36. (Tr. 7) 
The jury found the reasonable rental value of the prop-
erty from the date the plaintiffs sought to cancel the con-
tract to the date of the trial was $100.00 per month, a 
period of thirteen months and seven days. \Vhen the 
rent for that period is trebled, it amounts to $3970.00. 
The jury found that the costs of the improvements to the 
kitchen and front ro01n was $800.00, but $100.00 of that 
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amotmt was secured fro1n the salP of ehrmue <'hairs be-
longing to the 1notel. By deducting frmn the $~S,OOO.OO 
the amount that defendant~ wt\re in arrPar8 in the su1n 
of $1087.36 plus the $~3~)10.00, we haYP $~S,OOO.OO less 
$j057.36 = $~~,9-!:~.6-t. By adding to the $~~,9-!2.64 the 
$700.00 which defendant8 expended of their own nwney 
in improving the motel, we haYe $23,G-t:2.64. It will be 
seen that the trial court deducted from the $28,000.00 all 
that could possibly be said to be due on the contract. Ob-
viously the court was without authority to set off any 
judgment for dmnages to which defendants 'vere en-
titled against installments on the contract that were not 
yet due. It may also here be observed that when there 
was deducted from the amount that defendants were en-
titled to have awarded to them as damages a sufficient 
amount to place the contract in good standing, the con-
tract could not then be forfeited. 
It will be seen that the amount of the judgment ac-
tually rendered in favor of the defendants in the sum 
of $23,642.64 is substantially less than defendants are 
entitled to if and when they are permitted to recover 
the money they have actually paid for the property and 
the improvement thereof, plus the difference between the 
income that they received and the amount that they 
would have received if the income of the property had 
been as represented. The $18,934.00 which we have here-
tofore computed does not take into account the fact that 
Miss Carruth paid $350.00 a month for only 4 or 5 months 
when the rent was reduced to $300.00 per month for the 
remainder of the year. (Tr. 123) Nor does it take into 
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account that the income of the motel during the approxi-
mate month that Mr. Lyon was operating the motel was 
only $255.00. 
1'his Court being, as it is, committed to the doctrine 
that a purchaser who is defrauded in the purchase of real 
e8tate is entitled to recover as damages the differences be-
tween the actual market value of the property and its 
value if the same had been as represented, there would 
seem to be no escape from applying that doctrine to the 
income derived from the property, especially where it is 
purchased primarily because of its income, and award 
to the defrauded purchaser the difference between the 
income that was received and the income that would have 
been received if the property had been as represented. 
Indeed, unless such doctrine is applied to the facts in 
this case, the defendants are without redress for the 
fraud perpetrated upon them beyond the recover of the 
price they paid on the motel. In such case, the defend-
ants will have devoted their time for a period of twenty-
nine months and four days in operating the motel at a 
loss of both their time and money. 
We are mindful that the defendants could not, for 
an indefinte period, recover as damages the difference 
between the income of the property and such income if 
the same had been as represented. In this case, the de-
fendants had no means to protect their interest in the 
motel after the action was brought by the plaintiffs to 
cancel the con tract except to retain possession of the 
property until the case was adjudicated. Had the de-
fendants surrendered possession of the motel pursuant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
69 
to plaintiffs' acUon, they would have forfeited all rights 
thereto and the plaintiffs would then be in a position to 
assert that they were enUtled to retain the property 
and all money paid on the contract and i1nprovmnents 
made to the motel as liquidated drunages. Such a re~mlt 
would be unconscionable. 
It may be that what we have said in our discussion 
of Respondents· Points, which are in the nature of cross 
assignments of error, have served no useful purpose be-
cause the appellants make no claim that a wrong measure 
of damages was applied by the trial court, or that the 
judgment appealed from is not supported by the special 
verdict found by the jury. If such be the view of the 
court, it "'ill, of course, confine its review to the points 
raised by the appellants, in any case we submit that the 
judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DON MAGK DALTON 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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